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‘DID THE COURT DIG TOO DEEP?’:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT’S
DECISION IN ROBINSON TWP., WASHINGTON COUNTY V.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, ET AL.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Pennsylvania legislature codified its citizens’ right to sus-
tained, pure natural resources in 1971.1  The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court addressed this right in 2013 in Robinson Twp.,
Washington County v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al.2  The Com-
monwealth boasts a long history of producing one of these pro-
tected pure natural resources, energy, dating back to the world’s
first successful oil well drilling in 1859.3  More recently, Penn-
sylvania explored utilizing another source of energy other than oil:
natural gas, which exists in pockets rather than sustainable flows, as
originally thought.4
Drillers tapped a previously untouched source of natural gas,
the Marcellus Shale Formation, in the 1930s, exposing the pock-
eted nature of natural gas, and capturing the attention of the entire
industry.5  The Marcellus Shale Formation consists of black shale
deposited nearly four hundred million years ago throughout the
Appalachian basin, spreading from West Virginia to Eastern Ohio,
1. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (articulating Pennsylvania’s citizens’ right to public
natural resources: clear air, pure water, and preservation of esthetic values of
environment).
2. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 984 (Pa. 2013) (describing
court’s address).
3. See PENNSYLVANIA DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., Oil & Gas Well Drilling and Prod. in
Pennsylvania (March, 2011), available at https://thompson.house.gov/sites/thomp-
son.house.gov/files/PA%20DEP%20Oil%20and%20Gas%20Well%20Drilling%20
and%20Production.pdf (describing first successful commercial oil well drilling);
see also John A. Harper, The Marcellus Shale – An Old ‘New’ Gas Reservoir in Penn-
sylvania, 38 PA. GEOLOGY, no.1, at 2, (2008), available at http://www.dcnr.state.pa.
us/cs/groups/public/documents/document/dcnr_006811.pdf  (noting first natu-
ral gas well drilled in 1821 in Fredonia, N.Y.).  Drilling companies targeted “Penn-
sylvania grade” crude oil in Pennsylvania by constructing oil wells in Western,
Northern, and Central Pennsylvania, as well as in Eastern Ohio and upstate New
York. Marcellus Shale, PA. DEP’T OF CONSERVATION & NATURAL RES., http://www.
dcnr.state.pa.us/topogeo/econresource/oilandgas/marcellus/marcellus_faq/mar
cellus_shale/index.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2015).
4. See Marcellus Shale, supra note 3 (explaining importance of Marcellus Shale
to drillers).
5. See Marcellus Shale, supra note 3 (explaining Marcellus Shale Formation dis-
covery in 1930s and importance to drillers).  When tapped by creating fissures in
the shale, the Marcellus Shale Formation provides flowing gas. Id.
(325)
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Western, Central, and Northern Pennsylvania, and upstate New
York.6  Natural gas is trapped within the fissures and cracks of the
slowly decomposing shale.7  Hydraulic fracturing (fracking) is a
process where fluid and sand are pumped into the shale formation
under extremely high pressure to create fissures in the shale, releas-
ing natural gas.8
In the wake of the 1973 energy crisis, the United States Depart-
ment of Energy funded the Eastern Gas Shales Project (EGSP) to
determine shale’s production potential in the Appalachian, Illinois,
and Michigan region; the EGSP also strove to develop and imple-
ment new drilling and energy production technologies.9  During
the EGSP, oil and gas companies drilled five wells throughout
Pennsylvania, discovering potentially large gas reservoirs, and deter-
mined that enhanced fracking technology would provide a much-
needed alternative energy source.10  Technology has improved
drilling techniques in the Marcellus Shale Region, allowing drillers
to efficiently access shale and recover natural gas in large quanti-
ties.11  Due to the construction of more than 350,000 oil and gas
6. Id.  (describing nature and location of Marcellus Shale).
7. See Chris Amico et al., Shale Play: Natural Gas Drilling in Pennsylvania,
STATEIMPACT (2011), http://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/drilling/ (noting
natural gas locations).  The depth of Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania ranges from
zero feet to nine thousand feet, and the thickness ranges from twenty feet to sev-
eral-hundred feet. See Marcellus Shale, supra note 3.
8. See Amico, supra note 7 (describing process of fracking); see also WHAT IS
FRACKING, http://www.what-is-fracking.com (last visited Dec. 19, 2014) (providing
visual demonstration of fracking).  Fracking existed in Pennsylvania as early as the
1960s. Id.  Early on in the history of natural gas drilling, however, accessing the gas
from the Marcellus Shale Formation proved to be a formidable obstacle for drill-
ers, and therefore they largely ignored the Formation. See Harper, supra note 3.
9. See generally WHAT IS FRACKING, supra note 8 (explaining effects of energy
crisis); see also ENERGY FROM SHALE, www.energyfromshale.org (last visited Jan. 24,
2015) (describing fracking techniques used in drilling Marcellus Shale); see also
Milestones: 1969-1976, UNITED STATES DEP’T OF STATE OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN
(last modified Oct. 31, 2013), https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/oil-
embargo (explaining effects and history of oil embargo); Harper, supra note 3
(providing history and purpose of Eastern Gas Shales Project); Eastern Gas Shales
Project, PENNSYLVANIA DEP’T OF CONSERVATION & NATURAL RES., http://www.dcnr.
state.pa.us/topogeo/econresource/oilandgas/marcellus/marcellus_egsp/index
.htm (last visited March 13, 2015) (describing purpose of Eastern Gas Shales
Project).
10. See Eastern Gas Shales Project, supra note 9 (describing scope and results of
EGSP).  Drillers were initially only interested in shale close to the surface, which
was present in Western and North Central Pennsylvania. See Harper, supra note 3
at 4-5.  Access to deeper shale became of heightened interest in the 2000s. Id.
11. See id. (identifying current fracking methods); see also Marcellus Shale, supra
note 3 (explaining current fracking methods).  Particularly, horizontal drilling al-
lows drillers better and more efficient access to shale, and allows drillers to recover
gas in larger quantities using twenty times the fluids that would otherwise be used.
Id. See generally The Pennsylvania Guide to Hydraulic Fracturing, or “Fracking”,
2
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Marcellus Shale wells later, petroleum and natural gas have dis-
placed “Pennsylvania grade” crude oil from its former post as the
main source of energy in the Commonwealth.12  Fracking is steadily
taking over a large portion of Pennsylvania’s energy production in-
dustry; in fact, 6,634 active wells are currently spread over thirty of
the commonwealth’s sixty-seven counties.13
This Note examines the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Robinson Twp., Washington County v. Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania, et al., which held multiple provisions of Act 13
unconstitutional.14  Act 13, an amendment to Title 58 of the Penn-
sylvania Oil and Gas Act, drastically altered the landscape of prop-
erty owners’ energy production rights.15  This Note predicts the
potential impact of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision on
environmental and state constitutional jurisprudence in the Com-
STATEIMPACT, http://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/tag/fracking/ (last visited
May 3, 2015) (providing background and guide to understanding fracking).  Re-
ports indicate that more than sixty billion cubic feet per day was recovered by
fracking in the United States in 2012. See Wendy Koch, Fracking puts U.S. first in
shale gas production, USA TODAY (Oct. 23, 2013, 4:48 PM), http://www.usatoday
.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/23/fracking-shale-gas-us-global-leader/3170
255/.
12. See Pennsylvania Guide to Hydraulic Fracturing, or “Fracking”, supra note 10
(explaining transition from crude oil to petroleum and natural gas).  While Penn-
sylvania was a leading producer of oil in the 1800s, the Commonwealth now “con-
sumes much more natural gas than it produces.” Id.  In 2009, Pennsylvania
produced an estimated 3.6 million barrels of crude oil and 273 billion cubic feet of
natural gas. Id.  While fracking sites are located on hundreds of acres of land,
crude oil sites usually encompass less than one hundred acres. See Jim Martin,
What’s the Difference? Natural Gas or Conventional Crude, BEAVER COUNTY TIMES, Dec.
1, 2013, at A7.  Additionally, while a fracking site uses hundreds or millions of
gallons of water, a crude oil site uses hundreds of gallons of water. Id.
13. See Amico, supra note 7 (defining active wells as producing wells).  A diverse
state in terms of its geography and population, the 46,055 square-mile Penn-
sylvania spans 46,055 square-miles and has a population of 12.77 million people
spread throughout its sixty-seven counties. See State & County QuickFacts: Penn-
sylvania, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/
42000.html (last visited March 13, 2015) (listing population and geography of
Pennsylvania).  Home to the Appalachian Mountain Region, over six major rivers,
many layers of sandstone, shale, and coal, coastal plain, and multiple major
plateaus, Pennsylvania’s topography is widely varied. See id. See also Pennsylvania –
Topography, CITY DATA, http://www.city-data.com/states/Pennsylvania-Topography
.html (last visited March 13, 2015) (describing wide-ranging topography of
Pennsylvania).
14. See Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 985 (Pa. 2013) (stating
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s holding).
15. See id. at 913 (depicting Act 13’s wide effects on Pennsylvania’s natural
resources and environmental rights).
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monwealth.16  Part II offers a factual summary of Robinson Twp.17
Part III provides a legal background of the jurisprudence and statu-
tory framework that influenced the Court’s decision.18  Part IV re-
views the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s legal analysis in Robinson
Twp., with a particular focus on the Environmental Rights Amend-
ment of the Pennsylvania Constitution.19  Part V explores the po-
tential impact of the Robinson Twp. on future environmental
jurisprudence.20
II. FACTS
Less than a month after Pennsylvania Governor Tom Corbett
signed Act 13 into law in March 2012, Petitioners filed for review of
original jurisdiction, requesting that the Commonwealth Court de-
clare Act 13 unconstitutional and that the Court issue an injunction
to prohibit its implementation.21  Act 13, a major overhaul of the
Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act, aimed at advancing the development
of Pennsylvania’s oil and gas initiatives.22  In accomplishing these
16. For a narrative analysis of Robinson Twp., see infra notes 90-206 and accom-
panying text.  For a critical analysis of Robinson Twp., see infra note 207-30 and
accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the relevant facts of Robinson Twp., see infra notes 21-36
and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the relevant legal background information regarding
Pennsylvania environmental jurisprudence and related cases, see infra notes 37-89
and accompanying text.
19. For a narrative analysis of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in
Robinson Twp., see infra notes 90-206 and accompanying text; see generally PA.
CONST. art. I, § 27 (stating Environmental Rights Amendment).
20. For an analysis of the potential impact of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court’s holding in Robinson Twp., see infra notes 230-47 and accompanying text.
21. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 915 (Pa. 2013) (identify-
ing Petitioners and stating timing and elements of petition).  Petitioners, or ‘citi-
zens,’ include seven Pennsylvanian municipalities: Robinson Township,
Washington County, Pa.; Township of Nockamixon, Bucks County, Pa.; Township
of South Fayette, Allegheny County, Pa.; Peters Township, Allegheny County, Pa.;
Township of Cecil, Washington County, Pa.; Mount Pleasant Township, Washing-
ton County, Pa.; Borough of Yardley, Bucks County, Pa.; environmental association
Delaware Riverkeeper Network; and several individuals: Supervisor of Robinson
Township Brian Coppola, Councilman of Peters Township David M. Ball in both
individual and official capacity, Delaware Riverkeeper Maya Van Rossum, and
Mehernosh Khan, M.D. Id. at 901.  Plaintiffs’ full petition includes a broad request
to declare Act 13  unconstitutional, that a permanent injunction be issued against
the application of Act 13, and that Plaintiffs be awarded legal fees and costs. Id.
22. See Anna M. Clovis & Ross H. Pifer, The Pennsylvania Oil & Gas Act: Sum-
mary of the Statutory Provisions 58 P.S. §§ 601.101-601.607, THE AGRIC. LAW RES. AND
REFERENCE CTR., PA. STATE UNIV. DICKINSON SCHOOL OF LAW (March 2009), availa-
ble at https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/_file/aglaw/SummaryOfPennsylvaniaOilAnd
GasAct.pdf (summarizing purpose of Act 13).  Pennsylvania aimed to develop al-
ternative(s) to crude oil energy. Id.
4
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aims, however, it restructured zoning requirements, authorized
drilling in all zoning districts, and altered prohibitions on the con-
struction location of new wells.23  Chapter 32 of Act 13 set forth
limitations and allowances for drilling development and Chapter 33
described zoning ordinances and regulation of drilling
operations.24
Petitioners argued that “Act 13 violated the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution . . . [because it] was unconstitutionally vague, and violated
the separation of powers doctrine and the due process clause of the
U.S. Constitution.”25  Specifically, Petitioners alleged that Act 13 vi-
olated the following sections of the Pennsylvania Constitution: Arti-
cle I, Section 1; Article I, Section 10; Article I, Section 27; Article
III, Section 3; and Article III, Section 32.26
In July 2012, four months after Petitioners filed suit, the Com-
monwealth Court denied the Commonwealth’s request for sum-
mary relief.27  The Commonwealth Court, sitting en banc, held Act
13 unconstitutional in part, and enjoined the application of certain
provisions of Chapters 32 and 33 of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion.28  The effect of this injunction:
[W]as to prohibit the Department of Environmental Pro-
tection from granting waivers of mandatory setbacks from
certain types of waters of the Commonwealth . . . [] and to
permit local government to enforce existing zone ordi-
nances, and adopt new ordinances, that diverge from the
Act 13 legal regime, without concern for the legal or fi-
23. 58 PA. C.S. §§ 3303-3304, 3215 (West 2012).  For a further discussion of
Act 13 and its effects, see infra notes 152-06 and accompanying text.
24. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 915 (describing Chapters 32 and 33 of Act
13); see also 58 PA. C.S. § 3202-03 (stating text of Act 13 Sections 3302 and 3303).
25. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 915 (stating Plaintiffs’ original claims); see
also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
26. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 916 (describing Petitioners’ request to declare
Act 13 unconstitutional and to enact a permanent injunction prohibiting Act 13’s
implementation); see also PA. CONST. art. III, § 32.  In response to the petition, the
Commonwealth filed preliminary objections and cross-applications for summary
relief. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 916.  At the request of the Public Utility Commis-
sion and the Department of Environmental Protection, this matter was expedited
and set for argument as soon as possible in front of the Commonwealth Court en
banc. Id.
27. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 916 (describing Commonwealth Court’s treat-
ment of Commonwealth’s motion for summary relief).  The Commonwealth Court
sustained eight of the Commonwealth’s preliminary objections and overruled four
with grants of summary relief. Id.
28. Id. (stating Commonwealth Court’s holding).  The Commonwealth Court
enjoined the application of Sections 3215(b)(4) and 3304 of Chapter 32 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. Id.
5
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nancial consequence that would otherwise attend non-
compliance with Act 13.29
The Commonwealth Court enjoined provisions of Act 13 that
established waivers on the limitations of well drilling locations and
provisions that allowed for additional development of oil and gas
operations, specifically Sections 3215(b)(4) and 3304-3309.30  The
Commonwealth Court found Act 13 violated citizens’ due process
rights.31
In expedited, direct cross-appeals filed with the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, Petitioners and Defendants raised twelve unique
issues.32  On the merits, Defendants challenged the Commonwealth
29. Id. at 930 (stating Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s interpretation of effect
of Commonwealth Court’s holding).
30. Id. at 916 (stating Commonwealth Court’s holding regarding Sections
3304 and 3215(b)(4)); see also 58 PA. C.S. § 3304 (West 2012) (enacting additional
regulations to promote the development of oil and gas operations); see also
§ 3215(b)(4) (stating the circumstances in which distance restrictions of well site
preparation or drilling shall be waived).  The Commonwealth Court rejected the
following Petitioner claims: (1) provisions of Act 13 violate Article I, Section 27 of
the Pennsylvania Constitution (the Environmental Rights Amendment); (2) “that
Act 13 is a ‘special law,’ in violation of Article II, Section 32 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution;” (3) Section 3241(a) violates Article I, Sections 1 and 10 of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution by allowing for a taking of property; (4) “Section 3305(a)-(b)
delegates judicial and legislative powers to the Public Utility Commission, an exec-
utive agency, in violation of the separation of powers doctrine; and (5) that provi-
sions of Act 13 are unconstitutionally vague.” Id.
31. See generally Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 931 (stating grounds for Common-
wealth Court’s findings).  The Commonwealth Court determined Act 13, specifi-
cally Section 3304, violated citizens’ “due process rights by requiring local
governments to amend their existing zoning ordinances without regard for basic
zoning principles and, thereby, failing to protect interests of property owners from
harm and altering the character of neighborhoods.” Id.; see also Robinson Twp. v.
Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 463, 484-85 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012) (explaining Common-
wealth Court’s reasoning).
32. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 916 (stating parties’ agreement to expedite peti-
tion); see also Commonwealth Court Nullifies Two Key Provisions of Act 13, BLANK
ROME (Aug. 2012), http://www.blankrome.com/index.cfm?contentID=37&
itemID=2872 (explaining implications of expedited petition).  The parties agreed
to expedite briefs and arguments in front of the Supreme Court; however, this left
the Court shorthanded. Id.  Justice Joan Orie Melvin was suspended from the
Court on May 18, 2012, leaving the bench with six instead of seven justices. See Lily
Kuo, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Judge Charged with Corruption, REUTERS (May 18,
2012, 4:42 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/18/us-usa-pennsyl
vania-corruption-idUSBRE84H13J20120518 (explaining Pennsylvania Supreme
Court was short one justice at time Robinson Twp. was heard).  With Justice Orie
Melvin’s absence, the Supreme Court decided this case 4-2. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d
at 901.  Chairman Robert F. Powelson of the Public Utility Commission and then-
Secretary Michael L. Krancer of the Department of Environmental Protection filed
on behalf of the Commonwealth (Agencies’ Brief as Appellants), separately from
appellants Office of the Attorney General and then-Attorney General Linda L.
Kelly (OAG’s Brief as Appellant). Id.  Plaintiffs responded to Commonwealth ap-
6
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Court’s finding that Sections 3215(b)(4) and 3304-3309 of Act 13
were unconstitutional, which waived limitations on well drilling lo-
cations and allowed for additional development of oil and gas oper-
ations.33  Petitioners challenged the lower court’s finding to sustain
Defendants’ objection that various provisions of Act 13 violated the
Pennsylvania Constitution, which therefore declared Act 13 was un-
constitutional in its totality.34  The Supreme Court found that Sec-
tions 3215(b)(4), 3215(d), 3303, and 3304 violated the
Environmental Rights Amendment.35  In a 4-2 decision, the Su-
preme Court held the following Sections of Act 13 unconstitutional:
3303, 3304, 3215(b)(4), and 3215(d).36
III. BACKGROUND
A. Pennsylvania Constitution: The Environmental Rights
Amendment
The Environmental Rights Amendment of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, unanimously approved in 1971, enumerated the Dec-
laration of Rights to the people of the Commonwealth.37  Article I
Section 1 declares fundamental rights that are reserved by the peo-
ple.38  Article I, Section 27, the Environmental Rights Amendment,
peals in “Citizens’ Brief as appellees” and “Citizens’ Brief as cross-appellants.” Id.
The Supreme Court expedited arguments at the parties’ request. Id.
33. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 916 (describing Defendant’s challenge to Com-
monwealth Court’s holding that Sections 3215(b)(4) and Sections 3304-3309 are
unconstitutional); see also 58 PA. C.S. § 3215(b)(4), 3304-09 (West 2012) (stating
text of Sections of the Act at issue).  When the case reached the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court, the Court first addressed questions of justiciability, particularly
whether Petitioners Brian Coppola, David M. Ball, and the seven municipalities
had standing. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 918.  The Supreme Court affirmed the
Commonwealth Court’s decision, finding Petitioners Coppola, Ball, and the seven
municipalities had standing, and dismissed Defendant’s ripeness claim. Id. at 920.
The Supreme Court further found Plaintiffs Maya van Rossum, the Delaware River
Keeper Network, and Dr. Mehernosh Kohn had standing with respect to ripeness,
reversing the decision of the Commonwealth Court. Id. at 922, 925.  In addressing
whether Petitioners presented a justiciable question, the Supreme Court affirmed
the lower court’s decision, holding that Petitioners’ claims were justiciable. Id. at
930.
34. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 916 (discussing Plaintiffs’ challenge to Com-
monwealth Court’s decision).  The decision was to sustain Defendants objections
to Plaintiffs’ claim that Act 13 violated the following provisions: Article I, Section
27; Article II, Section 32; Article I, Section 10; separation of powers doctrine; and
vagueness. Id.
35. See id. at 1000 (explaining court’s holding).
36. Id. at 910 (stating court’s holding).  The Supreme Court held the follow-
ing Sections of Act 13 unconstitutional as not severable: 3305, 3306, 3307, 3309,
3215(b), 3215(c), 3215(e). Id.
37. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (detailing Environmental Rights Amendment).
38. Id. (declaring citizens’ protected rights under Pennsylvania Constitution).
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establishes the people’s right to clean, pure, and preserved public
natural resources, as well as the Commonwealth’s responsibility to
ensure the maintenance of these resources for years to come.39
The opening paragraph of the Environmental Rights Amendment,
Article I, Section 27, states:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to
the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and es-
thetic values of the environment.40  Pennsylvania’s public
natural resources are the common property of all people,
including generations yet to come.41  As trustee of these
resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and main-
tain them for the benefit of all people.42
Prior to Robinson Twp., the claims examined by the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court regarding the application of Section 27 of
the Environmental Rights Amendment were either: (1) claims that
implicated alleged “violations of constitutional rights,” specifically,
challenges to private or governmental development projects, or (2)
claims that implicated alleged “violations of property rights,” specif-
ically, challenges to environmental quality laws.43  These challenges
established that constitutional rights are broadly applied to statutes
and determined the Environmental Rights Amendment should not
be narrowly applied.44  Further, previous case law implicating the
Environmental Rights Amendment has not required the Court to
distinguish rights guaranteed under the first, second, or third
clauses of the Amendment.45
39. Id. (proclaiming declaration of rights).  The text of Article I Section 1
reads: “Inherent rights of mankind.  All men are born equally free and indepen-
dent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of
enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and attracting
property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness.” PA. CONST. art. I,
§ 1.
40. PA. CONST. art. I, § 1 (stating Individual Rights Clause).
41. Id. (discussing citizens’ rights).
42. Id. (stating Public Trust Doctrine).
43. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 964 (stating two categories of Section 27 chal-
lenges faced by Pennsylvania Supreme Court).
44. Id. (explaining application of Environmental Rights Amendment).
45. Id. (noting past courts’ lack of distinguishing requirements under each
clause of Environmental Rights Amendment).  The failure to distinguish rights
guaranteed by the clauses poses difficulty for future courts when deciding cases
implicating section 27. Id.  For further discussion of clauses 1-3 of Section 27, see
supra note 27 and accompanying text.
8
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B. Existing Jurisprudence Challenges to Private or Government
Development Projects
In 1973, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Common-
wealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower,46 a case in which the
Commonwealth sought to enjoin Adams County from constructing
an observation tower on private property in Cumberland Township
located near the Gettysburg Battlefield.47  The Commonwealth’s
challenge to the construction alleged that the tower would erode
the natural beauty and environment of the historic battlegrounds.48
Because the County lacked specific land use regulation legislation
restricting the development, the Commonwealth was only able to
seek relief under Article I, Section 27.49  A divided Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court upheld the lower court’s decision to deny the Com-
monwealth relief under Article I, Section 27, finding that the
Environmental Rights Amendment was insufficient to regulate pri-
vate property to protect the trust’s values.50  As the opinion failed to
yield a majority rule, it lent minimal guidance for future courts in
deciding how to apply Section 27.51
In Payne v. Kassab,52 a 1975 decision, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court again provided little guidance for future courts at-
tempting to determine the proper applications of Section 27.53
Residents of Wilkes-Barre sought to enjoin the Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of Transportation’s plan to widen a street at the expense of
46. 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973).
47. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 964 (introducing claims in relevant prior case
law); see also National Gettysburg, 311 A.2d at 590 (interpreting Environmental
Rights Amendment).  Gettysburg and Cumberland Township are located in Adams
County, Pennsylvania. Id.
48. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 964 (stating claims in National Gettysburg).
49. Id. (stating outcome related to Commonwealth); see also National Gettys-
burg, 311 A.2d at 591 (stating that Commonwealth’s suit is entirely built upon Arti-
cle I section 27).
50. See National Gettysburg, 311 A.2d at 595 (concluding Section 27 was insuffi-
cient for Commonwealth to rely on in attempted regulation).
51. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 960 (showing no rule developed).  Three
justices wrote that Section 27 was not self-executing, and therefore the Common-
wealth could not seek relief absent legislation implementing the Amendment. Id.
Therefore, those justices would have dismissed the case before reaching the mer-
its. Id.  Three justices would have affirmed the lower court’s decision finding the
Commonwealth failed to carry its burden of proof. Id.  Two justices believed Sec-
tion 27 was self-executing and would have reversed the lower court’s decision on
the merits. Id.
52. 312 A.2d 86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
53. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 965 (introducing Payne); see also Payne, 312 A.2d
at 86 (addressing Environmental Rights Amendment and duties of
Commonwealth).
9
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one-half acre of a local park.54  The residents alleged that the Com-
monwealth had violated its duty as a trustee of public natural re-
sources under Section 27 by approving the project.55  The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s
denial of the residents’ relief and held that “inter alia, the residents
had not met their burden of proof.”56  The Court asserted that the
Commonwealth’s role as trustee required it, via agency action, to
prevent and avoid environmental harm.57  The Supreme Court rea-
soned that when a reasonable, feasible alternative was not available,
the Commonwealth had to allow land use where the environmental
impact of the use was limited.58
Arguably more important than the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court’s holding in Payne is the lower Commonwealth Court’s articu-
lation of a three-part test that it applied in determining whether the
residents had met their burden of proof under Section 27.59  In
Payne, this three-part test was developed in the context of a clause 2
and 3 challenge of Section 27; however, future Commonwealth
Court jurisprudence applied the test universally to environmental
rights claims.60  The test, as applied in Payne, stated that for a party
to gain relief in a Section 27 challenge, the Court must consider the
following three factors: (1) compliance with relevant statutes and
regulations related to the Commonwealth’s duty to protect public
natural resources; (2) demonstration of a “reasonable effort to re-
duce the environmental incursion to a minimum”; and (3) an
“abuse of discretion” resulting from the Act and the environmental
harm that “clearly outweigh[s] the benefits to be derived.”61
54. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 965 (stating facts of Payne); see also Payne, 312
A.2d at 97 (stating holding).  The Department of Transportation’s project also
included removing several trees and eliminating a pedestrian sidewalk. Robinson
Twp., 83 A.3d at 965.
55. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 965 (stating claims in Payne).
56. Id. (stating Court’s holding).  The Court concluded rather than “merely
asserting a common right to a protected value under the trusteeship of the state,”
the challengers must balance the purpose of action in accordance with legislation
(such as the project in question and the approved Act 120 of 1970), in the interest
of conserving natural resources. Id.
57. Id. (applying Public Trust Doctrine to facts).
58. Id. (explaining application of public trust doctrine used to determine ho-
lding).
59. Id. at 966 (introducing Payne three-part test).
60. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 966 (explaining courts’ application of Payne
test).
61. Id. (stating Payne three-part test).
10
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C. Existing Jurisprudence on Challenges that Implicate
Weighing Article I Rights
Other previous challenges the Supreme Court addressed in-
cluded claims challenging environmental legislation enacted to im-
plement the protective duties of Section 27.62  In 1980, the Court
decided a dispute between property owner lessees and the former
Department of Resources, National Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Common-
wealth Dep’t of Envtl. Res.63  The property owners leased land to a
company who used it for business activities involving chemicals pre-
serving wood.64  The business had dumped liquid containing toxic
chemicals into a well that drained into groundwater and flowed
into a stream, and the Department ordered the business to cease
this activity, citing the Clean Streams Law.65  The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court upheld the Department’s orders under Section 27 of
the Pennsylvania Constitution, and rejected the business’ argument
that Section 27 was an overbroad exercise of police power, instead
holding that balancing the interests of the community with the state
exercise of its police power required corrective orders relating to
ownership or occupancy.66
In a different challenge, United Artists’ Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City
of Philadelphia,67 the Supreme Court rejected a theater owner’s Arti-
cle I, Section 27 challenge that alleged the historic landmark desig-
nation of the interior and exterior of the Boyd Theater in
Philadelphia violated the United States Constitution’s Takings
Clause.68  In its decision, the Court determined that designating the
interior of the theater as a historic landmark exceeded the scope of
the City’s statutory authority, and the City’s action did not consti-
tute a taking under either the Pennsylvania or United States Consti-
tutions.69  The Court, however, stated that the Pennsylvania
Constitution did not guarantee more expansive rights than its fed-
62. Id. at 967-68 (addressing other past challenges faced by Supreme Court in
environmental rights jurisprudence); see also PA. CONST. art I., § 27.
63. National Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Commonwealth Dep’t of Envtl. Res.,
414 A.2d 37 (Pa. 1980) (discussing court’s address).
64. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 967-68 (describing key facts of Nat’l Wood
Preservers).
65. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 967-68 (describing Court’s reasoning in Nat’l
Wood Preservers); see also 35 P.S.C.A. § 69.1.
66. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 968 (stating Court’s holding).
67. 635 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1990).
68. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 968 (explaining facts of United Artists); see also
U.S. CONST. amend. V.; United Artists’, 635 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1990) (stating court’s
holding).
69. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 968 (explaining United Artists court’s
reasoning).
11
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eral counterpart, and Section 27 “reflects a state policy encouraging
the preservation of historic and aesthetic resources.”70  In cases
such as United Artists in which private interests challenge legislation
that was intended to protect the rights described in the Environ-
mental Rights Amendment, the Court has generally determined
Section 27 outweighs private interests, largely relying on its require-
ment that the Commonwealth act to protect public natural re-
sources in Pennsylvania.71
D. Act 13 and the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act
In 1984, Pennsylvania passed Title 58, the Oil and Gas Act,
which established regulations for natural gas wells and drilling in
the Commonwealth.72  The Oil and Gas Act aimed to promote the
safe production and development of natural gas resources, to pro-
tect individuals and facilities in the oil and gas industry, to protect
the people and property rights of those living in areas affected by
oil and gas production, and to protect Pennsylvania’s public natural
resources as prescribed by Article I Section 27 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.73  Act 13 amended the Oil and Gas Act by creating
additional regulations for well permits, well location restrictions,
water supplies, well requirements, and disclosure of fracking chemi-
cals, among other issues.74  Specifically, Act 13 amended the follow-
ing chapters of Title 58: Chapters 23, 25, and 27; and created the
following chapters: Chapters 32, 33, and 35.75
70. Id. at 968-69 (quoting United Artist’s description Pennsylvania Constitution
Section 27).
71. Id. at 969 (explaining trend in court’s decisions regarding challenges to
General Assembly’s police power).
72. See Oil & Gas Well Drilling Prod. In Pennsylvania, supra note 3  (summariz-
ing Oil and Gas Act of 1984); see also 58 PA. C.S. § 601.101 et. seq (stating applica-
bility of Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act).
73. See 58 PA. C.S. § 601.102 (explaining purposes of Oil and Gas Act); see also
Clovis, et. al, supra note 21 (summarizing Oil and Gas Act).  The DEP’s Oil and Gas
Management Program works in conjunction with the Oil and Gas Act to develop
and enforce regulations supporting the Oil and Gas Actis aims regarding explora-
tion, development, management, and disposal of natural gas wells. See Oil and Gas
Well Drilling and Prod. in Pennsylvania, supra notes 3, 72.
74. See Pa. S.B. 1359 (2013-2014) (describing Act 13’s effect on Oil and Gas
Act).
75. See Pa. H.B. 1950 (2011-2012); see also Act 13 of 2012, PENNSYLVANIA DEP’T
OF ENVTL. PROT., http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/
act_13/20789 (last visited March 15, 2015) (explaining provisions of Act 13); see
also Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013); see also Common-
wealth Court Nullifies Two Key Provisions of Act 13, supra note 31.
12
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Act 13 was a major overhaul of Title 58, the Oil and Gas Act, of
the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes.76  The declared purposes
of Title 58 were: (1) “Permit optimal development of oil and gas
resources” in the Commonwealth that is consistent with the “protec-
tion of the health, safety, environment and property of Penn-
sylvania citizens”; (2) Protect the safety of employees employed in
coal mining, exploration, development, storage, and production of
natural gas or oil; (3) “Protect the safety and property rights of per-
sons residing in areas where mining, exploration, development,
storage or production occurs”; and (4) “Protect the natural re-
sources, environmental rights and values secured by the Constitu-
tion of Pennsylvania.”77  Act 13 was introduced in November 2011,
and underwent extensive debate and alteration before Governor
Corbett, signed the Bill into law on February 14, 2012.78
Act 13 targets provisions within Chapters 33 and 32 of Title
58—Sections 3303 through 3309—by restructuring ordinances re-
lating to oil and gas operations.79  For example, Section 3303 states
that the intent of Act 13 “is to preempt and supersede local regula-
tion of oil and gas operations regulated by the [statewide] environ-
mental acts, as provided.”80  Section 3304 imparts requirements on
political subdivisions aiming to ensure uniformity among local ordi-
nances regarding maintenance and development of oil and gas re-
sources.81  Section 3304 imposes revolutionary changes upon
existing Pennsylvania zoning, particularly in residential areas.82  For
example, Section 3304 requires local government to authorize oil
76. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 969 (describing effect of Act 13 on Penn-
sylvania Oil and Gas Act); see also 58 PA. C.S. § 3202 (stating text of Act 13 Section
3302).
77. 58 PA. C.S. § 3202 (stating  ‘Declaration of purpose’ of Oil and Gas Act);
see also Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 969.
78. Id. (explaining introduction of House Bill 1950).  The House adopted the
Bill in November 2011 by a vote of 107 to 76. Id.  The Senate amended the bill in
December 2011 by a vote of 28 to 22. Id.  The House did not accept the amend-
ments, so the Bill was sent to a conference committee in February 2012. Id.  After
the conference committee adopted the Bill, it was sent to both houses. Id.  The
Senate adopted the Bill in February 2012 by a vote of 101 to 90 and the House
adopted it  later that month, also by a vote of 101 to 90. Id.
79. 58 PA. C.S. § 3303-3309.
80. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 970 (quoting Act 13); see also 58 PA. C.S. § 3303
(stating text of Act 13 Section 3303).
81. 58 PA. C.S. § 3304; see also Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 970 (explaining ef-
fects of Section 3304 on local government activity).
82. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 970 (describing effects of Section 3304).
13
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and gas operations in all zoning districts and authorize the opera-
tion of natural gas processing plants in industrial districts.83
Through Section 3215, Act 13 dictates prohibitions and al-
lowances of oil and gas well locations implicating “sensitive water
sources.”84  Additionally, when oil and gas well operators submit a
plan for well site construction, drilling, and operation, Section
3215(b)(4) grants the operators automatic waivers that allow them
to avoid otherwise applicable location restrictions.85  Under Section
3215(d), local municipalities may submit written comments to the
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) detailing local
conditions and existing circumstances for DEP evaluation; however,
the DEP is not required to act upon these comments.86
83. See id. at 971 (identifying effects of Section 3304); see also 58 PA. C.S.
§ 3304 (stating text of Act 13 Section 3304).  Section 3304 also authorizes condi-
tional use of the operation of natural gas processing plants in agricultural districts.
Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 971.  Chapter 33 Sections 3305 through 3309 create an
“enforcement mechanism to facilitate” the implementation of legislation and the
provisions set out by Section 3304. Id. at 972.  Section 3305, for example, autho-
rizes the Public Utility Commission (PUC) to relay advisory opinions to municipali-
ties regarding their compliance with local ordinances and Act 13, and authorizes
the PUC to issue mandates requiring municipalities’ compliance. See id.  While
advisory opinions are not appealable, the Commission’s orders are subject to de
novo review by the Commonwealth Court. Id.  Section 3306 “authorizes civil ac-
tion in the Commonwealth Court to enjoin the enforcement of a local ordinance”
that is allegedly contrary to Act 13 Chapters 32 and 33. Id.  Through Section 3307,
the Act created strict financial penalties for local governments whose newly-en-
acted legislation fails to comply with its provisions. Id.  Possible penalties include
shifting court costs to the local government for “willful or reckless disregard of Act
13.” Id.  Section 3308 states a local government may be ineligible for unconven-
tional gas well fees if a court or the Public Utility Commission determines the local
government violated Act 13. Id.  Additionally, Section 3309 creates a 120 day grace
period after the effective date of Act 13 for local governments to bring their ordi-
nances and land-use planning schemes in compliance with the Act. Id.
84. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 972 (explaining permissible oil and gas well
locations enumerated in Section 3215 with respect to sensitive water resources).
The court cited the United States Geological Survey to determine that sensitive
water sources included blue lined streams, wetlands greater than one acre, and any
“spring or body of water as identified on the must current” topographic map ac-
cording to the United States Geological Survey. Id.
85. See id. at 973 (explaining extent of oil and gas operators’ entitlements
under Section 3215(b)); see also 58 PA. C.S. § 3215(b) (stating text of Act 13 Sec-
tion 3215(b)).  Additionally, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Pro-
tection (DEP) enjoys broad authority to grant waivers to circumvent gas well
restrictions under Section 3215(b). Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 973.  If a drilling
waiver is appealed, the DEP, rather than the well operator, has the burden of prov-
ing the conditions set forth in the waiver were necessary to protect against proba-
ble harm impacting the natural resources as a result of the drilling. Id.
86. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 973 (describing lack of required communication
between Commonwealth agency and municipalities); see also 58 PA. C.S. § 3215(d)
(stating text of Act 13 Section 3215(d)).  Additionally, municipalities do not have
the right to appeal the DEP’s determination of waiver. Id.
14
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E. Substantive Due Process
Under the Fifth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, substantive due process prohibits
states from intruding upon or depriving any persons of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law.87  State intrusions into
these rights must be fair, reasonable, and for the purpose of ad-
vancing a legitimate government interest.88  During the initial pro-
ceeding, the Commonwealth Court found Act 13 an
unconstitutional violation of due process.89
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
Prior to Robinson Twp., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had
not encountered the opportunity to examine the original text and
meaning of Article I Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.90
When the case reached the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, it ex-
amined the constitutionality of central provisions Act 13 with re-
spect to the Commonwealth’s duty as trustee of Pennsylvania’s
public natural resources.91  First, the court analyzed Article I, Sec-
tion 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Environmental Rights
Amendment, which states:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to
the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and es-
thetic values of the environment.  Pennsylvania’s public
natural resources are the common property of all people,
87. U.S. CONST. amend. V.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  For further discussion
of substantive due process see infra note 199 and accompanying text; see generally
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (describing why due process
clause encompasses substantive due process).
88. See Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (explaining interplay between due process clause
and substantive due process); see also Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365, 386 (1926) (holding that municipality’s zoning ordinance did not violate
realty company’s substantive due process rights under Fourteenth Amendment);
see generally Ira Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L.
REV. 981 (1979) (expanding on substantive due process and intricacies of Four-
teenth Amendment).
89. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 463, 484-85 (Pa.Commw. Ct.
2012) (describing Commonwealth Court’s reasoning). Affirmed in part and re-
versed in part. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 901, 984.
90. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 964 (discussing Supreme Court’s environ-
mental jurisprudence).
91. See id. at 914 (stating Court’s findings regarding Act 13 and Common-
wealth’s duty as trustee).  The court focused on Act 13 Sections 3215(b)(4),
3215(d), 3303, and 3304 , and depleted the Commonwealth’s duty as trustee. Id.
at 930.  The Pennsylvania Environmental Rights Amendment prescribed the Com-
monwealth’s duty to act as protector of rights under the Public Trust Doctrine. Id.
at 956.
15
Farley: Did the Court Dig too Deep?': An Analysis of the Pennsylvania Sup
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
340 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI: p. 325
including generations yet to come.  As trustee of these re-
sources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain
them for the benefit of all people.92
The court next turned to analyzing four key provisions of Act
13 with respect to the Environmental Rights Amendment.93  In par-
ticular, it will focused on Sections 3303, 3304, 3215(b), and
3215(d).94 Finally, Justice Baer’s concurring opinion veered from
the majority’s finding Act 13 unconstitutional using the Environ-
mental Rights Amendment as its basis, and instead he relied on a
substantive due process analysis.95  The Supreme Court declared:
At its core, this dispute centers upon an asserted vindica-
tion of citizens’ rights to quality of life on their properties
and in their hometowns, insofar as Act 13 threatens degra-
dation of air and water, and of natural, scenic, and es-
thetic values of the environment, with attendant effects on
health, safety, and the owners’ continued enjoyment of
their private property.96
When the case reached the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, De-
fendants challenged the lower court’s decision that Sections
3215(b)(4) and 3304-3309 of Act 13, waiving limitations on well
drilling locations and allowing for additional development of oil
and gas operations, were unconstitutional.97  Petitioners challenged
92. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.  For further discussion of the Environmental
Rights Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution, see supra note 37 and accom-
panying text.
93. See PA CONST. art. I, § 27 (stating Environmental Rights Amendment); see
also Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 974 (expanding Environmental Rights Amendment
analysis); see also 58 PA. C.S. §§ 3303, 3304, 3215(b)(4), 3215(d) (stating text of
applicable Act 13 provisions).  For discussion of the court’s analysis of Act 13, see
infra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
94. See 58 PA. C.S. §§ 3303, 3304, 3215(b)(4), 3215(d) (stating text of relevant
provisions of Act 13).  For a discussion of Section 3303, see infra note 134 and
accompanying text.  For discussion of Section 3304, see infra note 144 and accom-
panying text.  For a discussion of Section 3215(b)(4), see supra note 157 and ac-
companying text.  For discussion of Section 3215(d), see infra note 169 and
accompanying text.
95. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 55-273 (explaining court’s analysis).  The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed the lower court’s decision de novo. Id. at
943.  For discussion of severability, the justices’ concurrences, and justices’ dis-
sents, see supra note 33.  The Supreme Court heard Petitioners’ claims regarding
the following provisions of Act 13: 3303, 3304, 3215(b)(4), 3215(d), 3305-3309.
Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 969.
96. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 942 (describing core issue).
97. See id. (describing Defendant’s challenge to Commonwealth Court’s hold-
ing that Sections 3215(b)(4) and Sections 3304-3309 are unconstitutional); see also
58 PA. C.S. § 3215(b)(4) (stating text of Act 13 Section 3215(b)(4)); see also 58 PA.
16
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the lower court’s decision to sustain Defendants’ objection to Plain-
tiffs’ claim that various provisions of Act 13 violated the Penn-
sylvania Constitution, rendering the entire Act unconstitutional.98
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found Sections 3215(b)(4),
3215(d), 3303, and 3304 violated the Environmental Rights Amend-
ment.99  In a 4-2 plurality decision, it held the following Sections of
Act 13 unconstitutional: 3303, 3304, 3215(b)(4), and 3215(d).100
Further, the following Sections of Act 13 were held unconstitutional
and not severable: 3305, 3306, 3307, 3309, 3215(b), 3215(c),
3215(e).101  This Note focuses on the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court’s analysis of the Environmental Rights Amendment, and its
decision with respect to Sections 3303, 3304, 3215(b)(4), 3215(d)
of Act 13.102
A. Addressing Past Environmental Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court addressed the three-part Payne test to de-
termine whether it provided an appropriate basis for analyzing Act
13; however, it noted at least three substantial difficulties in apply-
ing the test to the environmental rights jurisprudence implicated in
Robinson Twp.103  According to the Court, the Payne test too nar-
C.S. §§ 3304-3309 (stating text of Act 13 Sections 3304-3309).  When the case
reached the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, it first addressed questions of jus-
ticiability, particularly whether Petitioners Brian Coppola, David M. Ball, and the
seven municipalities had standing. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 920.  The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s decision, finding Pe-
titioners Coppola, Ball, and the seven municipalities had standing and dismissed
Defendant’s ripeness claim. See id. at 922, 925.  The court further found that Plain-
tiffs Maya van Rossum, the Delaware River Keeper Network, and Dr. Mehernosh
Kohn had standing with respect to ripeness in this suit, reversing the Common-
wealth Court’s decision. See id. at 930.  In addressing whether Petitioners
presented a justiciable question, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court’s decision, holding that Petitioners’ claims were justiciable. Id.; see also
58 PA. C.S. § 3215(b)(4); 58 PA. C.S. §§ 3304-3309.
98. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 930 (explaining Plaintiffs challenge to Com-
monwealth Court’s decision to sustain Defendant’s objections claimed the follow-
ing provisions were violated by Act 13: Article I, Section 27; Article II, Section 32;
Article I, Section 10; separation of powers doctrine; and vagueness).
99. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 1000 (explaining court’s holding).  For fur-
ther discussion of Sections 3303 through 3309 and Section 3215 of Act 13, see infra
114 and 124 and accompanying text.
100. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 910 (stating court’s holding).
101. See id. (stating court’s holding).
102. See id. at 985 (elaborating on court’s holding of non-severable provi-
sions).  While Petitioners raised several secondary claims, including claims Act 13
violated the prohibition against enactment of special laws, claims Act 13 violated
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and claims Act 13 violated the separa-
tion of powers doctrine. These issues will not be addressed in this piece. See id. at
986, 989, 991.
103. See id. (identifying difficulties with applying the Payne test).
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rowly construed the Commonwealth’s obligations under Section 27;
the actual text of the first clause of Section 27 is much more open-
ended than described in Payne.104  Second, “the test assumes the
availability of judicial relief premised upon Section 27 is contingent
upon and constrained by legislative action.”105  Lastly, Payne mini-
mized the reach of the executive and judicial branch’s power and
prescribes avenues for them to sidestep legislative control to carry
out their duties.106  With this analysis in mind, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court determined that the Payne test was too narrow,  and
instead turned to the Environmental Rights Amendment of the
Pennsylvania Constitution to analyze the constitutionality of Act
13.107
While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized the four
aforementioned cases provided substantive and controlling gui-
dance in some cases of environmental rights jurisprudence, it con-
cluded they were not controlling over the Appellant’s claims in
Robinson Twp.108  The court noted, contrary to the Environmental
Rights Amendment drafters’ expectations, environmental jurispru-
dence had not developed in the same way as political rights juris-
prudence.109  The court stated that lack of environmental
jurisprudence, however, did not release it from an obligation to de-
fend its citizen’s rights, and fulfill its Section 27 obligations.110
B. Identifying Commonwealth’s Duty to its Citizens
The court characterized the citizens’ claims as primarily impli-
cating “the Commonwealth’s duties as trustee under the Environ-
mental Rights Amendment,” thereby activating the Public Trust
Doctrine.111  Petitioners challenged the Commonwealth Court’s
finding that the General Assembly’s exercise of police power was
constitutional under the individual citizens’ guarantees established
104. See id. at 967 (identifying tendency of too narrowly construing Common-
wealth’s obligations under Section 27).
105. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 967 (identifying limits of judicial relief).
106. See id. (explaining judicial and executive branch’s ability to avoid execu-
tive control).
107. See id. (explaining court’s reasoning for not applying Payne test).
108. See id. at 969 (discussing past environmental jurisprudence).
109. See id. (recounting evolution of environmental jurisprudence, or lack
thereof).
110. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 969 (identifying court’s responsibility in
adjudicating claim).
111. See id. at 974 (framing Petitioners’ challenges as implicating Article I
Clause 1 of Pennsylvania Constitution).  For discussion of the Public Trust Doc-
trine, see infra note 129 and accompanying text.
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in the Environmental Rights Amendment.112  The Supreme Court
characterized Petitioners’ theory as a challenge to Act 13’s attempt
to threaten and degrade the citizens’ right to the pre-established
quality of life of their properties and hometowns.113  It also noted
the language of the Pennsylvania Constitution drove the court’s in-
terpretation and application of the Environmental Rights Amend-
ment, explaining that it must be interpreted in the manner
understood by the people when it was adopted, favoring a plain
language reading that aligns with the original intent.114
By first outlining the terms and purposes of the Common-
wealth’s Declaration of Rights, the Supreme Court emphasized that
the Constitution preserved the government created by the people
and highlighted specific limits on state governmental power.115
The Supreme Court identified two goals of the Environmental
Rights Amendment: (1) to identify protected rights to prevent cer-
tain state action, and (2) to establish a “framework for the Com-
monwealth to participate affirmatively in the development and
enforcement of” the protected rights.116  The Supreme Court fo-
cused on identifying the intent of the legislature in creating the law,
and the effect of the law on the rights allegedly violated.117
C. Article I, Section 1 of Pennsylvania Constitution: Inherent
Rights
The Commonwealth claimed municipalities had no role in oil
and gas operations and land use policy regulation, and that the ju-
diciary had no role in deciding the dispute in question.118  In the
Commonwealth’s view, neither the municipalities nor the judiciary
112. For discussion of the Environmental Rights Act, see supra note 44 and
accompanying text; see also PA. CONST. art. I, § 27; Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 942
(expanding Environmental Rights Amendment analysis).
113. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 942 (characterizing issue in Petitioners’ En-
vironmental Rights Amendment claim).
114. Id. at 943 (explaining Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s reading).  The Su-
preme Court applied the de novo standard of review in addressing Petitioners’
appeal challenging the lower court’s finding Act 13 did not violate the Environ-
mental Rights Amendment. Id.
115. See id. at 947 (quoting Appeal of Lord, 81 A.2d 533, 537 (Pa. 1951))
(recounting purpose of Declaration of Rights); see also PA. CONST. § 1 (stating text
of Pennsylvania Constitution Section 1).
116. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 950 (explaining organization of Environ-
mental Rights Amendment).
117. See id. (quoting Lehman v. Pennsylvania State Police, 839 A.2d 265, 270-1
(Pa. 2003)) (identifying Supreme Court’s approach in analyzing merits).
118. See Robinson Twp., 873 A.3d at 974 (describing Commonwealth’s claims
regarding Section 3303 and Pennsylvania Constitution Article I Section 27).
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had a role in questions of policy.119  Petitioners, contrastingly, con-
strued the claim as a violation of individual rights under the Envi-
ronmental Rights Amendment.120  The court characterized the
Petitioners’ claim as a violation of the Commonwealth’s constitu-
tional duties under Article I, Section 1, rather than a dispute over
municipal power.121  The court sided with Petitioners and declared
the Commonwealth’s attempt to minimize the Petitioners’ claim by
mischaracterizing it as a dispute over public policy “requires a
blindness to the reality here and to Pennsylvania history.”122  The
court emphasized that the Commonwealth’s position “ignores the
reality that Act 13 has the potential to affect the reserved rights of
every citizen of this Commonwealth now, and in the future.”123
D. Article I, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution: The
Environmental Rights Amendment
Because of the way in which Act 13 implicated the Pennsylvania
Constitution, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court began by first ana-
lyzing the language of Article I, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution.124  Act 13 implicated both the Commonwealth’s police
power, and citizens’ rights with respect to the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution.125  Specifically, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court analyzed
Article I, Section 27 to determine what the Pennsylvania Constitu-
119. See id. (explaining Commonwealth’s claim that Act 13 is valid within
General Assembly discretionary policymaking).
120. See id. (describing Petitioners’ characterization of claim).
121. See id. (describing Petitioners’ claim).
122. See id. (characterizing Commonwealth’s argument as off-target and sim-
plistic).  The court characterizes Act 13 as “not generalized environmental legisla-
tion, but [ ] instead a statute that regulates a single, important industry – oil and
gas extraction and development.” Id.  The Commonwealth’s argument therefore
incorrectly  minimizes the importance and potential effect of Act 13. Id.
123. See Robinson Twp., 873 A.3d at 976-77 (explaining Pennsylvania Supreme
Court’s view of Commonwealth’s characterization of Petitioners’ claim).  The
court noted the Environmental Rights Amendment “speaks on behalf of the peo-
ple,” which weighed into the court’s emphasis of the duty owed to the people by
the Commonwealth. Id. at 974.  Additionally, in emphasizing the court’s obliga-
tions as trustee, the court emphasized the people’s right to seek the enforcement
of the Commonwealth’s obligations. Id.
124. See id. at 947 (declaring General Assembly’s plenary police power is de-
rived from Pennsylvania Constitution Article III, but noting “express exception of
certain fundamental rights reserved to the people in Article I”).  Article I is appro-
priate for analysis in this case, as it reflects the original design of the Pennsylvania
Constitution: “one part establishes a government and another part limits that gov-
ernment’s powers.” Id.
125. Id.  (explaining Article I gives both power of governance and ability to
limit governance).
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tion required in terms of protecting citizens’ rights.126  The court
also analyzed Article I, Section 27 to determine whether Act 13
complied with the Commonwealth’s protective duties under the
Pennsylvania Constitution.127
1. Clause 1 Section 27 of Pennsylvania Constitution: Individual
Environmental Rights
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court first analyzed the plain lan-
guage of the first clause of Section 27.128  It indicated that this ini-
tial prohibitory clause established declared rights of citizens, such
as the right to clean air and the preservation of values of the envi-
ronment.129  The court identified the prohibitive nature of the
clause, noting that this clause “affirms a limitation on the state’s
power to act contrary to this right,” and thus characterized this pro-
vision as establishing the Commonwealth’s obligation to refrain
from violating this right through legislative action, executive action,
or otherwise.130  The Supreme Court further stated that Clause 1
requires the Commonwealth to consider these protections before
taking governmental action and predict the environmental impact
of its action, regardless of whether a statute addresses the specific
action.131
Next, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that the statute’s
plain language provides substantive provisions by which the judici-
ary decides a claim for violations of a protected right under Clause
1 of Section 27, such as the right to ‘clean air’ and ‘pure water.’132
Though courts defer to agency expertise in assessing whether these
standards are met, the court concluded that courts should draw on
“the express purpose of the Environmental Rights Amendment to
126. See id. at 948-49 (explaining Environmental Rights Amendment must be
defined and understood before applying its requirements to Act 13).
127. See id. at 949 (identifying Act 13 must comply with Commonwealth’s du-
ties under Environmental Rights Amendment).
128. See Robinson Twp., 873 A.3d at 950 (explaining merits will be determined
based on plain language, legislative intent, and effect of law).
129. See id. at 951 (discussing Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s analysis).  The
text of Pennsylvania Constitution Section 27 Clause 1 states: “The people have a
right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, his-
toric and esthetic values of the environment.” See generally PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
130. Robinson Twp., 873 A.3d at 951 (establishing requirements of Section 27
Clause 1); see also PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (stating text of Environmental Rights
Amendment).
131. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 951 (imposing responsibility on Common-
wealth to act a priori).  This obligation binds both state and local government. Id.
132. Id. (noting rights and substantive standards identified by Section 27
Clause 1).
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be a bulwark against actual or likely degradation of, inter alia, our
air and water quality.”133  It found, therefore, that courts should
appropriately weigh in on constitutional compliance of branches’
actions in alleged violations.134  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
applied similar analysis to the guarantees of preservation of “natu-
ral, scenic, historic, and esthetic values of the environment,” con-
cluding that citizens enjoy a right of freedom from governmental
action that unreasonably interrupts or causes actual harm or deteri-
oration to these values of the environment.135  Based on this con-
clusion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court again required that to
pass constitutional scrutiny, the government must evaluate poten-
tial preservation effects on environmental values.136
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized the important
state interest of promoting citizens’ economic well-being was partic-
ularly influential in the development of Clause 1 of Section 27;
these interests were not initially enumerated in the Pennsylvania
Declaration of Rights, but later introduced in the Environmental
Rights Amendment.137  In noting this, however, the court declared
that there must be a balance between the Declaration of Rights,
which was void of identified economic rights, and Clause 1 of Sec-
tion 27, which lacked restrictions on pursuits promoting economic
development.138  The court determined that the state’s plenary po-
lice power must be utilized to balance “sustainable property use”
and “economic development.”139  The provisions of the Act that al-
lowed for extensive energy production development, specifically in-
133. Id. at 953 (describing court’s method for considering agency expertise,
court’s role in deciding substantive matters, and language and purpose of Environ-
mental Rights Amendment).
134. Id. at 950 (identifying courts’ roles when addressing guaranteed stan-
dards and rights).
135. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (stating text of Environmental Rights Amend-
ment); see also Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 953 (discussing preservation of environ-
mental values).
136. Robinson Twp., 873 A.3d at 953 (stating court’s reasoning).
137. See id. at 954 (acknowledging legislative intent of Section 27).  The eco-
nomic well-being and rights are not specifically mentioned in the Pennsylvania
Declaration of Rights. Id.; see also PA. CONST. art. I.  For more information regard-
ing the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, see supra notes 37-45 and accompany-
ing text.
138. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 954 (determining there is no state legal
authority providing middle ground on economic well-being and development).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court warned that finding Section 27 Clause 1 free of
error would open the door to citizens being deprived of their personal property
rights to promote the general welfare and economic prosperity. Id.
139. See id. (identifying responsibility of state’s policing power).
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voked the Commonwealth’s plenary police power to balance
property use interest and economic development.140
2. Clauses 2 and 3, Section 27 of The Pennsylvania Constitution:
The Public Trust Doctrine
The Supreme Court articulated that the second clause of Sec-
tion 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution delegates ownership of
Pennsylvania’s public natural resources to the citizens, and provides
for future generations.141  Public natural resources include state-
owned property, such as waterways, lands, and mineral reserves, in
addition to “resources that implicate the public interest,” such as
air, ground water, fauna, flora, and fish.142  The court supported its
plain-language interpretation with legislative history; for example,
the court highlighted the General Assembly’s proposed amend-
ment to expand the concept of public natural resources.143
Lastly, the court described the third clause as establishing the
Commonwealth’s affirmative and prohibitive duties regarding pub-
lic natural resources, thereby formulating the ‘Public Trust Doc-
trine’ between the resources and the Commonwealth.144  The court
articulated the legal implications of the terms ‘trustee’ and ‘trust’ to
illustrate the discretionary, fiduciary relationship that exists be-
tween the Commonwealth and the public natural resources under
Clause 3 of Section 27.145  As part of the Public Trust Doctrine, the
140. See id. (explaining Section 27 Clause 1 required Commonwealth to use
its plenary power to balance property and economic interests).
141. Id.  The court suggested that, though it was not explicit, this Clause ref-
erenced a narrower category of ‘public’ resources than Clause 1. Id. at 955.
Through legislative history, however, the court determined aspects of the environ-
ment were subject to change over time. Id.; see also PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (stating
text of Environmental Rights Amendment of Pennsylvania Constitution).  The
court emphasized that duties and powers going along with the trust were not dele-
gated to any one branch of the government, and therefore, checks and balances
should be fully activated. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 957.  The text of Pennsylvania
Constitution Article I Section 27 Clauses 2 and 3 reads: “Pennsylvania’s public nat-
ural resources are the common property of all the people, including generations
yet to come.  As trustees of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and
maintain them for the benefit of the people.” See generally PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
142. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 957 (describing public natural resources).
143. Id. (recounting legislative history).
144. Id. at 955-56 (introducing ‘public trust doctrine’).  For further descrip-
tion of Clause 3 of Article I Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, see infra
notes 141-51 and accompanying text.
145. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 956.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied
on the General Assembly’s statements for its understanding of the trust theory. Id.;
see also 1970 Pa. Legislative Journal-House at 2273.  A trust theory treats citizens as
a fiduciary, while a propriety theory handles its citizens “‘at arms’ length.” Id.
While a trust theory measures success by its citizens’ use of natural resources
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Court noted that the Commonwealth was “obligated to comply with
the terms of the trust,” explaining that the Commonwealth must
conserve and maintain the public natural resources, as well as pre-
vent and remedy any negative effects on these resources.146
The court noted that two Commonwealth obligations arose out
of the Public Trust Doctrine: (1) the Commonwealth’s obligation
“to refrain from permitting or encouraging the degradation, dimi-
nution, or depletion of public natural resources” through state
and/or private acts that deplete, diminish, or degrade public natu-
ral resources, or through the state’s “failure to restrain the actions
of private parties”; and (2) “to act affirmatively to protect the envi-
ronment, via legislative action.”147  Regarding the trust benefi-
ciaries, the court identified two Commonwealth obligations: (1) the
obligation to treat all beneficiaries impartially; and (2) the obliga-
tion to “balance the interests of present and future
beneficiaries.”148
In addition to the Section 27 clauses, the court identified addi-
tional considerations regarding Section 27 legislative history and in-
terpretations.149  The court noted that the legislature passed
environmental protection statutes with increasing frequency be-
cause of the difficulty of repairing and regenerating natural re-
sources.150  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged that
this affirmation of environmental rights in conjunction with politi-
granted to them, a propriety theory focuses on “balance sheet profits” and appreci-
ation. Id.
146. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 957 (identifying Environmental Rights
Amendment).
147. Id. (quoting Environmental Rights Amendment).  With respect to the
first obligation, Section 27 Clause 3 established “broad but concrete substantive
parameters within which the Commonwealth may act.” Id.  The second provision,
according to the Court, defines and describes regulatory powers, prohibits conduct
by individuals, procedural safeguards, and technical standards.  At the same time,
it does not supersede any rights conferred to the people under Article I Section 1
of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id.
148. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 959 (identifying Commonwealth obligation as
prescribed by Pennsylvania Constitution).  The beneficiaries must be treated in
accordance with the purposes and goals of the trust. Id.  The court identified the
beneficiary designation implicated questions of access to public natural resources,
the need for conservation of resources, and the reality of environmental changes.
Id.
149. Id. at 959-60 (stating Pennsylvania Constitution intentionally places
equal importance on citizens’ environmental rights and citizens’ political rights).
150. Id. at 961 (recounting legislative history).  Disasters such as the 1948 in-
dustrial smog which caused at least twenty deaths due to asphyxiation, the 1961
mine water discharge that contaminated water and killed 300,000 fish, and the
1962 mine fire that displaced all of the town’s residents, are examples of increasing
environmental degeneration leading to increased legislative activity. Id.
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cal rights was rare, particularly at the time Section 27 was enacted,
which stressed the importance of protecting environmental
rights.151
E. Analyzing Act 13
The court stated that because Act 13 intended to regulate all
oil and gas operations throughout the state, both public and pri-
vate, the inherent power of the General Assembly invariably comes
into play.152  If it intended to regulate solely public operations, then
analysis of the Public Trust Doctrine alone would be sufficient.153
Because Act 13 sought to regulate private oil and gas enterprises as
well, the court stated that it must analyze the General Assembly’s
plenary power “to enact laws for the purpose of promoting the gen-
eral welfare, including public convenience and general prosperity,
rather than from its corresponding duties as trustee of Penn-
sylvania’s public natural resources.”154
1. Section 3303 Oil and Gas Operations Regulated by
Environmental Acts
Before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that Sec-
tion 3303 of Act 13 was unconstitutional, it addressed the authority
of the General Assembly to analyze Section 3303.155  The court
noted that, though the General Assembly had the authority to alter
local governments’ powers and obligations, it did not have the au-
thority to decrease a local government’s constitutionally-required
authority.156  Additionally, the court stated that constitutionally-im-
posed duties on local governments cannot be extirpated by
statute.157
151. Id. at 962 (stating court’s view of evolution of environmental rights).
Pennsylvania’s vast availability of natural resources and largely untapped potential
to exploit them are particularly note-worthy. Id. at 963.  The General Assembly
unanimously approved the Environmental Rights Act during the 1969-70 and
1971-72 sessions. Id.  Montana and Rhode Island were the only other states to
articulate environmental rights. Id.
152. Robinson Twp., 83 A. 3d at 975 (explaining breadth of Act 13’s intent to
closely regulate one particular industry).
153. Id. (describing Commonwealth’s ability to protect public natural
resources).
154. Id. (identifying why General Assembly’s plenary power is necessary to
analyze).
155. See id. at 977 (describing General Assembly’s powers).
156. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 977 (describing powers and limits of Gen-
eral Assembly’s authority).
157. See id. (addressing constitutionally-imposed authority).
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court framed its analysis of Section
3303 by stating that Article I, Section 27 names the Commonwealth,
not the General Assembly, as trustee.158  The court highlighted that
citizens affected by Act 13 had homes, lives, and certain residential
and property expectations that existed prior to the existence and
enactment of Act 13.159  The court described the effects of the en-
actment as a fundamental disruption to these citizens’ expecta-
tions.160  The Act, according to the court, necessitated that local
governments be entirely complicit with the environmental require-
ments of Act 13, regardless of whether local government charters
indicated otherwise.161  The court determined that Act 13 directed
local municipalities to abandon their Article I, Section 27 obliga-
tions and “take affirmative actions to undo existing protections of
the environment in their localities.”162  Based on these findings, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Section 3303 of Act 13 over-
stepped the General Assembly’s policing authority, an authority
limited by the constitutional requirements of the Environmental
Rights Amendment.163  The Supreme Court found this provision
inconsistent with the Environmental Rights Amendment, holding it
unconstitutional.164
2. Section 3304 Uniformity of Local Ordinances
With respect to Section 3304 of Act 13, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court found the provision unconstitutional as well.165  The
court determined that the enactment of Section 3304 violated the
General Assembly’s constitutional duty under Article I, Section 27
“to prevent degradation, diminution, and depletion of” public nat-
ural resources, and the Commonwealth’s duty to uphold the trust-
158. Id. (explaining Article I, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution); see
also PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (stating text of Environmental Rights Amendment).
159. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 977 (explaining pre-Act 13 residential and
zoning conditions).
160. See id. (describing disruptions to everyday life posed by enactment of Act
13).  The court concluded Act 13 required local governments to take serious mea-
sures to implement its requirements. Id.  The effect of the implementation, the
court reasoned, would seriously disrupt the established lives, homes, and living
expectations of citizens in affected residential zones. Id.
161. Id. (describing nature of Act 13’s requirements imposed on local
governments).
162. Id. at 978 (interpreting Act 13’s directive to local governments).  For fur-
ther discussion of Article I, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, see infra
notes 124-51 and accompanying text.
163. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 978 (stating court’s holding with respect to Act
13 Section 3303).
164. Id. (stating holding regarding Section 3303).
165. Id. at 979 (stating court’s holding on Section 3304 of Act 13).
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trustee relationship codified in the Public Trust Doctrine.166  The
court identified two reasons Section 3304 did not satisfy these con-
stitutional requirements.167
The court’s first reason involved a new regulatory scheme pro-
posed by Section 3304 permitting industrial fracking in pre-existing
zoning districts; this scheme essentially sanctioned degradation of
public environment, natural resources, and established quality of
life.168  The court identified that Act 13 permitted “industrial oil
and gas operations as a use ‘of right’ in every zoning district throughout
the Commonwealth, including in residential, commercial, and agricul-
tural districts.”169  Consequently, Act 13 effectively set aside the pre-
existing regulatory structure citizens had come to rely upon in af-
fected districts, and permitted the degradation of environmental
quality of life.170
The second reason identified by the court as to why Section
3304 violated the Pennsylvania Environmental Rights Amendment
166. See id. (explaining General Assembly’s constitutional duties implicated by
Section 3304); see also PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (stating text of Environmental Rights
Amendment).  For further discussion of the General Assembly’s constitutional du-
ties with respect to the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act, see supra notes 72-86 and
accompanying text.  Under Title 58 of the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act, the Gen-
eral Assembly’s constitutional duties include ensuring the general welfare and
prosperity of environmental rights by allowing for development of oil and gas in
Pennsylvania, and protecting public natural resources and environmental rights.
Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 979; see also 58 PA. C.S. § 3202 (2012) (stating text of Act
13 Section 3202).
167. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 979 (identifying two reasons that Section 3304
prevents General Assembly from meeting its constitutional obligations).
168. See id. at 979-80 (identifying first reason Section 3304 violates General
Assembly’s constitutional requirements).  The Court reasoned that the regulatory
scheme set out by Section 3304 made it impossible for the General Assembly to
preserve Pennsylvania’s constitutionally-protected public natural resources. Id. at
979.  The court observed the interest in preserving natural resources and the im-
pact of Section 3304 on local communities could not be achieved by issuing a
blanket-rule across the Commonwealth; protection of environmental values re-
quired considering the needs of local communities. See id.
169. Id. at 979 (interpreting Section 3304 to give fracking operations right to
operate in every zoning district).  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted Act 13
essentially displaced pre-existing guidelines limiting industrial use of residential
zoning districts. Id.  The court concluded that because the Commonwealth, its
communities, and the ownership and environmental rights expectations of its com-
munities existed long before the enactment of Act 13, the Act impermissibly in-
fringed on the trust-trustee relationship created by the Environmental Rights
Amendment of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id.  For further discussion of the
Environmental Rights Amendment of the Pennsylvania Constitution, see supra
notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
170. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 980 (analyzing effects of Act 13 Section
3304 on affected communities).  A secondary effect of Section 3304 was to expose
otherwise protected areas of the environment, such as air, water, soil, noise, light-
ing, and traffic, to industrial tampering. Id. at 979.
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was that allowing industrial uses in all districts impermissibly bur-
dened communities and properties that would effectively carry
greater environmental burdens than others.171  Section 3304 did
not treat all trust beneficiaries equitably, as it did not provide af-
fected communities with any opportunity to tailor regulations, nor
allow local governments to mitigate the impact of the provision on
the affected communities.172  The court reasoned that development
of sustainable resources might require some degradation of the
trust and public natural resources; however, any requirement com-
peting with constitutional commands would be impermissible.173
In concluding that Section 3304 was unconstitutional, the
court noted it would not allow policy arguments to sway its decision
in instances where the constitutional declaration is clear.174  Here,
the court did not find the Act’s economic and energy goals suffi-
cient to outweigh the constitutional commands of Article I, Section
27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.175  The court postulated that
the Environmental Rights Amendment was intended to act “as a
bulwark against enactments, like Act 13, which permit development
with such an immediate, disruptive effect upon how Pennsylvanians
live their lives.”176  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court thus held that
Section 3304’s degradation of the Public Trust Doctrine did not
square with the constitutional demands of the Environmental
Rights Amendment.177
171. See id. at 980 (identifying uniformity of Section 3304 does not recognize
differences in properties and communities).  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
characterized Act 13 as a “blunt approach” failing to account for the constitutional
requirement of Article I, Section 27 commanding the Commonwealth to manage
the trust-trustee relationship for the benefit “of all people.” Id. See also PA. CONST.
art. I, § 27 (stating text of Environmental Rights Amendment).
172. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 980 (reasoning Section 3304 is impermissi-
bly at odds with constitutional requirements).
173. Id. at 980-81 (conceding trust might suffer some decay in interest of pro-
moting sustainable development).
174. Id. at 981 (stating Section 3304 does not carry enough weight to over-
come Pennsylvania Constitution requirements).
175. See id. (analyzing mindset of framers and ratifiers of Environmental
Rights Amendment).
176. Id. (identifying Environmental Rights Amendment as protective measure
against environmental disruptions into citizens’ lives).
177. See Robinson Twp., 873 A.3d at 981-82 (explaining Court’s holding and
reasoning).  The court credited the intent of the Act, however it found that the
legislation was too sweeping, and effectively pushed aside the General Assembly’s
responsibilities under Article I, Section 27. Id.
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3. Section 3215(b)(4) Limitations to Well Locations
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court next determined that Sec-
tion 3215(b) was unconstitutional and impermissibly at odds with
the Environmental Rights Amendment.178  The court articulated
that a primary problem with Section 3215(b) was due to the DEP’s
ability to waive aspects of the well permit application that drillers
were required to submit under 3215(b).179  The court determined
that the effect of the DEP’s authority was that the Act authorized
the DEP to review industry concerns through comments and hear
industry appeals to rejected permits, but did so without allowing the
DEP to hear the concerns or appeals of local governments.180
Additionally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found Section
3215(b)’s grant of power to the DEP to waive the mandatory set-
backs for the gas industry problematic.181  The court concluded
that no provision of Act 13 adequately identified the measures “nec-
essary” for to grant waivers of setbacks.182  The court found that Act
13 lacked necessary protections guarding public natural resources
from damage caused by oil and gas operations, primarily due to the
broad language of Section 3215.183
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court further scrutinized the lan-
guage of Section 3215, finding that the term ‘necessary’ is “mallea-
ble” and “unpredictable” because the provision did not enumerate
ascertainable standards protecting public natural resources if the
DEP were to setback waivers for drilling location distance require-
ments for drilling locations.184  According to the provision, new
wells were to be at least 300 feet from protected waterways; how-
178. See id. at 982 (stating court’s holding with respect to Section 3215(b)).
The court noted that Section 3215(b) regulated the Commonwealth’s waters,
which are inclusive in the Article I, Section 27 trust-trustee relationship. Id. at n.
59.  The court observed the overall broad regulation decision process of Section
3215(b), rather than considering the provision in isolation. Id. at 982.
179. See id. at 982 (identifying primary concern of Section 3215(b)).
180. See id. (articulating effect of Act empowering DEP to consider comments
and hear appeals of industry).
181. See id. (finding issue with DEP’s ability to waive mandatory industry set-
backs per Section 3215(b)).
182. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 982 (stating court’s lack of findings).
183. Id. (identifying failure of Commonwealth to outline substantive reasons
for conditions of Section 3215).  Act 13 directed DEP to consider the Environmen-
tal Quality Board’s standards for determining whether to grant well permits. Id. at
982-83.  The Court found this impermissibly deprived citizens and local govern-
ments the opportunity to appeal the DEP’s decisions to grant particular permits.
Id.
184. See id. at 982-83 (concluding language of Section 3215 did not ade-
quately protect public natural resources from oil and gas operators when waiver of
permit granted).
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ever, this court determined, however, that Act 13 allows the DEP to
waive these setback requirements.185  This can only be done when
the DEP determines that a driller’s application demonstrates the
waterway in question will be protected.186  The court concluded
that the provision’s language provided no identifiable and enforce-
able standards for granting well permits and setback waivers.187
From this conclusion, the court reasoned the language itself ren-
dered the provision’s terms arbitrary and ineffective for protecting
the Commonwealth’s waters.188  The court found that this provi-
sion, like Sections 3303 and 3304, failed to comply with the Envi-
ronmental Rights Amendment.189  Additionally, this specific
provision did not satisfy the trust-trustee responsibility to ‘conserve
and maintain’ public natural resources.190  The court determined
the language of Chapter 32 of Act 13 reduced the DEP’s authority
to control environmental standards, and instead encouraged the
DEP to stray from sustainable development of public natural
resources.191
4. Section 3215(d) Consideration of Municipality and Storage
Operator Comments and Additional Protective Measures in
Well Location Restrictions
In the court’s last finding regarding Section 3215 of Act 13, it
decided 3215(d) effectively discouraged and decreased affected res-
ident and property owner participation in the process of sustaining
and protecting public natural resources.192  The court concluded
this would fail, as it does not address individual environmental con-
ditions of local municipalities and fails to ensure equitable, impar-
185. Id. at 984.  Procedurally, if an applicant were to appeal the DEP’s deci-
sion to deny its permit or waiver, the DEP would then be required to prove its
determination was ‘necessary’ to protect public natural resources. Id.  The Court
characterized these procedural mandates as “topsy-turvy” because they effectively
required the DEP to dictate minimal ‘necessary’ standards to avoid litigation by the
applicant. Id.
186. 58 PA. C.S. § 3215(b)(2012) (stating text of Act 13 Section 3215(b)); see
also Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 983-984 (describing effects of Section 3215(b)).
187. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 984 (concluding Chapter 32 of Act 13 did
not sufficiently identify standards to determine when to grant permits  and
waivers).
188. See id. (determining language of Chapter 32 established arbitrary terms
causing provision to become ineffective given vague standards).
189. See id. (stating court’s finding with respect to Section 3215(b)).
190. See id. at 984 (stating court’s conclusion with respect to trust-trustee rela-
tionship and water as public natural resource).
191. See id. (identifying effect of Chapter 32 on DEP’s authority).
192. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 984 (describing Chapter 32).
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tial treatment of all trust beneficiaries.193  In light of these findings,
the court deduced that Act 13 did not permit the Commonwealth
to abandon its responsibilities to the people in the Public Trust
Doctrine of Article I, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution by
discharging the responsibility to the DEP.194  The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court held that Sections 3303, 3304, 3215(b)(4), and
3215(d) were an impermissible exercise of the Commonwealth’s
police power, unconstitutionally infringing upon the Common-
wealth’s duty as trustee to protect public natural resources.195
F. Justice Baer’s Concurrence: Act 13 Violates Substantive Due
Process Requirements
Justice Baer concurred with the majority’s opinion of Sections
3303, 3304, 3215(b), and 3215(d); however, he diverged from the
majority’s analysis of Petitioners’ substantive due process claims.196
Justice Baer declared that the majority improperly decided the is-
sues through the lens of Article 1, Section 27, of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.197  He stated the proper way to settle the issues was to
resolve Petitioners’ claim that the General Assembly unconstitution-
ally extended its police power as a matter of substantive due pro-
cess.198  Justice Baer therefore, also found Sections 3303, 3304,
3215(b), and 3215(d) unconstitutional, although he did so for dif-
ferent reasons.199
193. See id. (finding inequitable treatment of local conditions and local mu-
nicipalities due to Section 3215).
194. See id. (stating court’s finding with regards to Section 3215).
195. Id. at 985 (stating court’s mandate).  The court found these provisions
unconstitutional, thereby affirming in part (on different grounds) and reversing in
part the Commonwealth Court’s decision. Id.  The court did not address claims
related to Sections 3215(b)(4) and 3304 because it determined they violated the
Environmental Rights Amendment. Id.  The court also failed to address the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine or the due process clauses of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion and United States Constitution. Id.
196. See id. at 1000 (Baer, J., concurring) (stating Justice Baer’s concurrence).
Justices Saylor and Eakin dissented in the opinion. See id. at 1009, 1014 (Saylor, J.,
dissenting) (Eakin, J., dissenting).  Justice Saylor based his dissent on a belief judi-
cial review should be highly deferential to the legislature; and therefore, the judici-
ary should have deferred to the legislature’s findings in enacting Act 13. Id. at
1010 (Saylor, J., dissenting).  Justice Eakin agreed with Justice Saylor’s dissent and
additionally noted the majority’s decision would increase litigation by municipali-
ties and individuals. Id. at 1015 (Eakin, J., dissenting).
197. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 1000-01 (Baer, J., concurring) (declaring sub-
stantive due process analysis more important than Environmental Rights Amend-
ment analysis).
198. See id. at 1001 (Baer, J., concurring) (discussing alternative basis upon
which to resolve issue).
199. See id. (noting diversity and largeness of Pennsylvania land better suits
substantive due process than Environmental Rights Amendment adjudication); see
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While the majority determined the Environmental Rights
Amendment protected citizens’ use of public natural resources, Jus-
tice Baer found that substantive due process protected these
rights.200  Justice Baer agreed with the Commonwealth Court that
through Act 13, the General Assembly “forced municipalities to ‘vi-
olat[e] substantive due process because [municipalities can no
longer] protect the interests of neighboring property owners from
harm,’ and further because Act 13 ‘alters the character of neighbor-
hoods, and makes irrational classifications.’”201  Justice Baer noted
that Act 13 was not a “‘run of the mill’” zoning ordinance creating
a government intrusion into private property.202  Instead, Act 13 ex-
panded private property rights to allow landowners to permit drill-
ing operations on their land.203  Justice Baer argued Act 13
intruded on the private property rights of neighbors to drilling op-
erations.204  This, he noted, effectively permitted landowners to vio-
late sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas by diminishing these
neighbor’s enjoyment of the land.205
Justice Baer also highlighted Pennsylvania’s “extreme diver-
sity.”206  He criticized the Act for its overbroad generalization of
Pennsylvania, which failed to recognize the diversity of its citizens
also Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 463, 483 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012) (not-
ing that state’s interests in oil and gas development “is centered primarily on the
efficient production and utilization of the natural resources on the state,” while
state’s interests in zoning is to promote proper development and land use).
200. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 1003 (Baer, J., concurring) (agreeing with
Commonwealth Court’s reasoning).  Justice Baer noted the tension in this appeal
resulted from determining whether the General Assembly has the authority to, by
law, remove local municipalities’ power to vindicate Pennsylvania landowners’ in-
dividual substantive due process rights. Id. at 1002 (Baer, J., concurring).
201. Id. at 1003 (Baer, J., concurring) (stating Justice Baer’s reasoning and
quoting Commonwealth Court); see also Robinson Twp., 52 A.3d at 485 (majority)
(contrasting Commonwealth Court’s majority opinion).
202. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 1004-05 (Baer, J., concurring) (explaining
complexities of Act 13’s mandate).
203. Id. at 1005 (Baer, J., concurring) (characterizing effect of Act 13).
204. Id. (Baer, J., concurring) (identifying governmental interference of Act
13 zoning mandate affected private property rights of neighbor, rather than
landowner).
205. See id. (Baer, J., concurring) (noting effect of mandate permitting land-
owners to drill on their property); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1872 (9th ed.
2009). ‘Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas’ defined as: use your own so as not to
injure another’s property. Id.
206. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 1006 (Baer, J., concurring) (describing
Pennsylvania’s population, residents, population density, geographic makeup, and
size).
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and geographical makeup.207  Additionally, Justice Baer purported
this violation of substantive due process was “the epitome of arbi-
trary and discriminatory impact” because it failed to provide any
mechanism or remedy for municipalities objecting to the Act’s re-
quirements.208  Though Justice Baer reached the same conclusion
as Justice Castille’s plurality opinion, his conclusion rested on the
principle that Act 13 forced local municipalities “to enact zoning
ordinances, [thereby violating] the substantive due process rights of
their citizenries,” which “cannot survive strict constitutional
scrutiny.”209
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Robinson Twp. represents a monumental decision in Penn-
sylvania environmental law.210  The Pennsylvania legislature had
never enacted an environmental law so thoroughly implicating the
right to public natural resources through the Environmental Rights
Act.211  As such, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had never de-
cided such an extensive environmental issue.212 Robinson Twp. re-
quired the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to analyze the
Pennsylvania Constitution’s Environmental Rights Amendment to
determine the constitutionality of Act 13, and it arrived at a reason-
able conclusion in determining the provisions were unconstitu-
tional.213  Justice Castille’s opinion rejected the Commonwealth
Court’s findings that Sections 3303, 3304, 3215(b), and 3215(d)
were unconstitutional on zoning, agency discretion, or substantive
207. See id. at 1006-07 (Baer, J., concurring) (critiquing Act 13’s failure to
protect interests of neighboring property owners and irrational characterization of
municipalities as homogenous).
208. See id. at 1007 (characterizing Act 13 and its effects).
209. See id. at 1008 (stating Justice Baer’s conclusion).  Justice Baer empha-
sized that Act 13 subjected Pennsylvania landowners and Pennsylvania land to the
same arbitrary impact, despite differences in neighborhoods and topography. Id.
He described Act 13 as setting the Commonwealth’s municipalities in a vacuum.
Id.  In addressing severability, Justice Baer found to enjoin Sections 3305-3309 of
Act 13 “as ‘incapable of execution’ upon the striking of Sections 3303 and 3304.’”
Id.
210. See Marie Cusick, Did Pennsylvania’s Highest Court Unravel Environmental
Protections for Oil and Gas?, STATEIMPACT (Jan. 10, 2014, 5:08 PM), https://
stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2014/01/10/did-pennsylvanias-highest-court-
unravel-environmental-protections-for-oil-and-gas/ (highlighting extreme impor-
tance of Supreme Court’s decision).
211. For further discussion of existing environmental jurisprudence, see supra
notes 37-71 and accompanying text.
212. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 964-68 (explaining first time Supreme
Court has faced such extensive provisions and effects).
213. See id. at 964 (identifying lack of Pennsylvania jurisprudence).
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due process grounds.214  The majority instead focused its analysis
on Act 13’s threat to degrade public natural resources, which the
Commonwealth is required to protect under the Environmental
Rights Amendment.215
As the four-justice majority failed to thoroughly address sub-
stantive due process issues surrounding Sections 3303, 3304,
3215(b), and 3215(d), and instead focused its analysis on the Envi-
ronmental Rights Amendment, the court effectively emphasized
the importance of deciding these issues under the Pennsylvania
Constitution’s Public Trust Doctrine, rather than through a sub-
stantive due process analysis.216  The court’s opinion stressed the
importance of protecting public natural resources under the Penn-
sylvania Constitution, and emphasized the limits of the General As-
sembly’s plenary police power.217  Through the Environmental
Rights Amendment, the majority determined the Commonwealth
was required to protect the Commonwealth’s public natural re-
sources on behalf of all citizens.218  The majority’s pointed concen-
tration on the Environmental Rights Amendment effectively
highlighted the absence of a substantive due process analysis.219
Courts are careful when deciding cases on substantive due pro-
cess grounds, because this lends itself to controversy.220  Deciding
this particular case on substantive due process grounds would in-
flame the hotly debated fracking issue with emotionally charged ju-
risprudence.221  This case also has no clear resolution considering
214. See id. at 942 (rejecting Commonwealth Court’s reasoning).
215. See id. at 973 (stating Commonwealth’s duties under Environmental
Rights Amendment).
216. See id. at 942 (stating grounds for decision).
217. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 974 (discussing appropriate analysis under
Pennsylvania Constitution).
218. Id. at 965 (establishing Commonwealth’s duties under Public Trust Doc-
trine).  The Supreme Court’s analysis only addressed environmental rights protec-
tion issues under the Pennsylvania Constitution. See generally id. at 942.
219. See Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 463, 482 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2012) (discussing substantive due process analysis); see also In re Appeal of Realen
Valley Forge Greenes Assocs., 838 A.2d 718 (Pa. 2003) (describing balancing land-
owners’ rights against public interests).
220. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1501,
1502 (Summer 1999) (discussing controversial and confusing nature of substantive
due process).
221. See generally Robinson Twp., 52 A.3d at 480-84 (discussing Commonwealth
Court’s holding).  For discussion of commonality of fracking in Pennsylvania, see
supra notes 5-13 and accompanying text.
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Pennsylvania’s geographical diversity and the varying interests of its
population.222
Instead of grounding this controversial decision in substantive
due process, the majority sunk its teeth deep into the Environmen-
tal Rights Amendment.223  In fact, the majority glazed over the
Commonwealth Court’s substantive due process analysis of zoning
ordinances, and failed to address Justice Baer’s concurrence agree-
ing with the lower court’s reasoning.224  The Supreme Court major-
ity’s analysis, Justice Baer’s concurrence, and the Commonwealth
Court’s analysis each sought to protect public natural resources and
private property owners’ rights from harm, yet sought to achieve
these ends through differing avenues.225
The majority’s explanation for finding sections of Act 13 un-
constitutional provided an in-depth, concrete basis in the Penn-
sylvania Constitution, that Justice Baer’s concurrence lacked.226
Justice Baer’s reasoning, however, provided insight into the major-
ity’s omission of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment analyses of Sec-
tions 3303, 3304, 3215(b), and 3215(d).227  Justice Baer’s
substantive due process analysis critically touched upon the rights
protecting a landowner’s property rights from his neighbor’s utili-
zation of Act 13 zoning mandates.228  Because Act 13 mandated that
well operations be permitted in every zoning district in the Com-
monwealth, Justice Baer properly expanded private property rights
222. For discussion of Pennsylvania’s geographic diversity, see supra notes 6-
13 and  208-22 and accompanying text.
223. See Robinson Twp., 83 A. 3d at 1000 (Baer, J., concurring) (discussing
court’s analysis).  For discussion of the court’s Environmental Rights Amendment
reasoning, see supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
224. See Robinson Twp., 52 A.3d at 481-82 (stating zoning extends public nui-
sance concept and Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process inquiry was
warranted); see generally City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725
(1995) (discussing public nuisance and zoning).
225. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 1000 (Baer, J., concurring) (concluding Act
13 threatened Commonwealth’s diversity of resources); see generally id. at 983 (ma-
jority) (stating Act 13 violated Pennsylvania Constitution by degrading public natu-
ral resources); see also Robinson Twp., 52 A.3d at 484-85 (concluding Section 3304
failed to protect neighboring property owners’ interests in resources from harm).
226. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 1000 (Baer, J., concurring) (reasoning Sec-
tions 3303, 3304, 3215(b), and 3215(d) should be held unconstitutional as matter
of substantive due process).
227. See id. at 1003 (Baer, J., concurring) (addressing Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments).  Zoning in this case implicates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, as zoning is a governmental interference affecting private property interests
of a landowner’s neighbor. Id. at 1004.
228. See id. at 1003 (Baer, J., concurring) (addressing Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments).  Zoning in this case implicates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments because it is a governmental interference that affects private property inter-
ests of a landowner’s neighbor. Id. at 1004.
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to include the rights of a landowner whose neighbor utilized Act
13’s allowance of well operations in the district.229  This expansion
of rights, therefore, implicated substantive due process.230  In sup-
port of this proposition, Justice Baer wrote in his concurrence:
“While I acknowledge that it might be possible, I am skeptical that
the legislature could devise a scheme of statewide scope that suffi-
ciently protects substantive due process.”231
While the majority’s treatment of the Environmental Rights
Amendment was fair, adequate, and correct, its decision to dig
deep into Environmental Rights Amendment analysis and not ad-
dress the controversial substantive due process jurisprudence is no-
table.232  Instead of deciding the issue on potentially confusing,
controversial grounds, the majority looked to the Pennsylvania
Constitution to determine whether Act 13 complied with constitu-
tionally-mandated requirements.233
VI. IMPACT
Robinson Twp. affects future interpretations of environmental
rights afforded to citizens of Pennsylvania by the Environmental
Rights Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution.234  As the ma-
jority touched upon in its analysis, past Pennsylvania case law has
not significantly involved the Environmental Rights Amendment.235
In the few instances the Amendment was implicated, the Court was
not required to thoroughly parse the Amendment’s language and
229. See id. at 1005 (Baer, J., concurring) (arguing Act 13 expands private
property rights because of secondary effects of well operations felt by neighbors of
land with well operations).  For further discussion of substantive due process see
supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
230. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 1000 (Baer, J., concurring) (explaining why
substantive due process is implicated).
231. Id. at 1003 (agreeing with Commonwealth Court’s conclusion finding
Act 13 unconstitutional on substantive due process grounds).
232. See id. at 1005 (explaining Justice Baer’s reasoning for substantive due
process analysis); see also id. at 942 (majority opinion) (stating violations of Envi-
ronmental Rights Amendment as grounds for finding Act 13 unconstitutional).  It
is noteworthy that the majority opinion does not spend much time delving into the
substantive due process analysis.  The majority neither affirms the lower court’s
substantive due process analysis, nor denies it as incorrect. Id.
233. Id. at 944-45 (majority) (articulating decision to review issue through
lens of Environmental Rights Amendment).
234. See id. at 942 (premising determining issues on Environmental Rights
Amendment).  For further discussion of the Environmental Rights Amendment,
see supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
235. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 964 (articulating lack of Environmental
Rights Amendment challenges faced by Supreme Court).
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meaning.236  The court’s decision in Robinson Twp. is a great leap
forward from this past jurisprudence; however, it is consistent with
past case law because the Environmental Rights Amendment had
never been directly challenged.237  The Supreme Court’s decision
in Robinson Twp. defined and explained each clause of the Amend-
ment: the individual rights clause, and the public natural resources
clause, as well as the Public Trust Doctrine.238
Given the depth of this decision, it this Amendment will likely
be implicated more often in the future as lower courts benefit from
clearer standards.239  The Supreme Court has now affirmed citi-
zens’ individual rights to natural resources such as clean air and
water, requires the Commonwealth not to infringe upon these
rights, and states that the Commonwealth had an affirmative duty
to protect these rights and resources.240  Because the Common-
wealth’s obligations and the citizen’s guaranteed rights are more
clearly defined, future environmental endeavors are likely to feel
the effects of this decision.241  Energy development and oil and gas
well drilling in Pennsylvania will likely be affected by this decision,
as fracking operations expand in frequency and quantity in the
Commonwealth.242
To the extent this decision applies to fracking operations, this
decision will substantially affect interpretation of Act 13 as an
amendment to the Oil and Gas Act.243  Any future application of
this decision will complicate drillers’ ability to obtain waivers from
the mandatory setback distances of well locations from protected
waterways.244  These limitations will impact local municipalities at-
tempting to restrict well locations and drillers attempting to con-
236. See id. (stating previous challenges did not fully implicate extent of Envi-
ronmental Rights Amendment).
237. See id. at 950 (explaining Environmental Rights Amendment).
238. See id. at 957 (identifying court’s need to unpack and apply Environmen-
tal Rights Amendment).
239. See John C. Dernbach et al., Robinson Township v. Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania: Examination and Implications, WIDENER LAW SCHOOL LEGAL STUDIES RE-
SEARCH PAPER SERIES no. 14-10, at 9 (Mar. 1, 2014) found at http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2412657 (characterizing effect of decision as
revitalization of Environmental Rights Amendment).
240. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 942 (addressing Environmental Rights
Amendment).
241. See Dernbach et al. supra note 221, at 14 (identifying trend of environ-
mental law and awareness it may grow).
242. See Cusick, supra note 194 (tracking gas production in Pennsylvania).
243. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 910 (stating court’s holding).
244. See id. at 982 (noting that Section 3215(b) aimed to regulate Common-
wealth’s waters).  Though Act 13 created a process of granting and receiving set-
back waivers for drilling operations, the court effectively pulled the punch of this
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struct new wells.245  Further, this decision will affect the lives of
Commonwealth residents: any person working in the fracking in-
dustry, any landowner with wells on their property, any researcher,
doctor, or medical professional interacting with environmental and
health effects of fracking, any neighbors living in areas near frack-
ing wells, local government officials, and many others.246  Given
fracking’s rapid growth, all residents involved in the development,
harvesting process, or regulatory oversight will likely feel the effects
of the Supreme Court’s decision.247  In conclusion, this case more
clearly defines and enumerates public natural resources to citizens
than had been done so in the past, and cuts back on fracking’s
expansive operations allowances.248  The 4-2 decision, comprised of
Justice Baer’s commanding concurrence alongside the four-justice
majority, however, provides many possibilities of interpretation by
future lower courts.249  This seemingly monumental decision may
in fact result in open interpretation in lower courts due to its lack
of commanding majority.250
Meghan A. Farley*
process by finding Section 3215(b) unconstitutional. Id.  For further discussion of
setback waivers, see supra notes 178-88 and accompanying text.
245. See generally Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 982 (explaining location restric-
tions of wells and granting well location permits).
246. See id. at 1015 (Eakin, J., dissenting) (articulating majority’s findings will
increase litigation).  Justice Eakin emphasized in dissent that the effect of this deci-
sion will deprive more than 2,000 local municipalities of constitutional rights. Id.
247. See generally id. (emphasizing in depth litigation to follow this decision).
248. See id. (emphasizing extent of litigation to follow this decision); see also
The Fracking of Act 13: How the Supreme Court Torpedoed Marcellus Law, THE ALLE-
GHENY FRONT (Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.alleghenyfront.org/story/fracking-act-
13-how-supreme-court-torpedoed-marcellus-law (predicting effects decision will
have on all future Pennsylvania courts deciding environmental law issues).
249. See generally Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d 901, 984 (Pa. 2013) (holding Sections
3215(b)(4), 3215(d), 3303, and 3304 unconstitutional on grounds of Environmen-
tal Rights violation).  For a discussion of Justice Baer’s concurrence, see supra
notes 193-06 and accompanying text.  A controlling majority failed to materialize
in this opinion due to expedited arguments and Justice Orvie Melvin’s absence.
See Commonwealth Court Nullifies Two Key Provisions of Act 13, supra note 32.
250. See Kuo, supra note 32 (identifying Justice Orvie Melvin’s absence).  Jus-
tice Baer’s reasoning, and the Commonwealth Court’s reasoning, provides an al-
ternative method of interpreting the constitutionality of fracking regulations. See
supra notes 192-206 and accompanying text.
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Villanova University School of Law; B.A., 2012, Villa-
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